Spectrum auction has been considered as an effective way for dynamic spectrum access. In this paper, we propose a novel spectrum auction framework which enables spectrum spatial reuse among secondary users (SUs) and the payment rule is optimized here. There are two stages during the framework: auction and payment. Auction phase, the winner determination problem (WDP) is modeled as a 0/1 knapsack problem, and the Genetic Algorithm is selected to solve it. Payment phase, a payoff function similar to the Second-Price Auction is made, to ensure that all the SUs can get non-negative utilities only with their truthful information. Finally, simulation experiments show that the proposed auction mechanism has a better performance in solving the problem of WDP.
Introduction
The spectrum has become a scarce resource with the explosive growth demand for wireless equipment and applications. Cognitive networks have been proposed to overcome the trouble as a prospective approach by achieving dynamic spectrum access [1] . In cognitive networks, the owners of spectrums are called primary users (PUs) and the users who have to apply spectrums from PUs are secondary users (SUs). [2] introduced the cooperative communication and sharing between PUs and SUs.
There are three main models for spectrum sharing between PUs and SUs. First is the Graph Coloring Model. The second is Game Theoretic Model. The third one is Auction Model and its small signaling overhead makes it popular. Recently, to solve the dynamic spectrum allocation or dynamic spectrum access using the economic tools become more and more popular [3] . Auction Model is suitable for the center type cognitive network architecture. In [4] , there is a non-profit controller called spectrum broker hosts the auction activities. Qinhui took the location factors into auction activity and began to care about the QoS in [5] . But none of those papers have taken the location factor into account and assumed there is no spectrum spatial reuse among the SUs.
In this paper, we allow the spectrum spatial reuse among SUs and then model the dynamic spectrum allocation as a 0/1 knapsack problem, in which the total amount of spectrum PU leased is regard as the capacity of a knapsack and the various bidding information of SUs are regard as different goods with values.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we propose the system model. In Section III, we illustrate the details of the spectrum auction framework, analyze the NP-hardness of the social welfare maximization problem, and prove the optimize payment rule can assure the networks' truth. Section IV presents the simulation results and section V concludes our paper.
System Model
As shown in Figure 1 , we consider a cognitive network consists of one PU, multiple SUs and a central entity named spectrum broker used for holding the auction activities. In our paper, we allow there is spectrum spatial reuse among the SUs. We denote the SUs by {1, 2, 3,..., n} N = and assume the spectrum broker is non-profit. In one auction, the spectrum broker decides the winners to maximize the PU's revenue. In every round auction, let's use m to denote the amount of the auctioned channels PU lease. Maybe the bandwidth of channels is various, we assume they are the same, in order to be simple. Different SUs have different demand for spectrums, they have also calculated the values themselves for their needed spectrum, denote by 1 2 {v , ,..., } n V v v = , their bids denote as 1 2 {b , ,..., } 
Truthful Spectrum Auction
In this section, the proposed truthful spectrum auction with a novel allocation mechanism is discussed in detail. We first formulate the winners determination problem as a 0/1 knapsack problem. And we modified the genetic algorithms to adapt to the spectrum auction we proposed. After that, a pricing scheme like Second-Price Auction is designed to ensure that all SUs can have a non-negative utility only by their real information.
Winner Determination Problem
The truthful spectrum auction consists of one PU has some goods (spectrum) to sell, and multiple SUs with different demands. Define t represents the total quantity of spectrum for leasing and w means the bandwidth of PU's channels. Each i su has a different spectrum demand i d and a private valuation i v for the demand. And i v equals the monetary value of Shannon capacity that i su could gain from i d demand channels as
(1)
where in i σ is the currency weight and i η means the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Both of them are constants for every i su [6] . At the beginning of the auction, PU report its information m and w to the spectrum broker. Meanwhile, SUs send their bids too, denoted as i Bid , 1, 2,..., i n =
. Each bid i Bid also specified as a 6tuple (b , , , , , )
the spectrum demand of the bidder i su . b i indicates the payment i su is willing to pay for i d . After obtaining the complete information, the spectrum broker first identified the locations of all bidders and broken them into several layers. In each layer, all the bidders have no communication range of a cross and various destinations. All SUs are broken into l layers, let l L denoting the th l layer. Obviously, all SUs in the set l L should satisfy the following condition:
The first inequality means that there is no overlap in communication ranges between i su and j su . After all the SUs have been layered, the spectrum broker formulates an optimization problem to determine the winners to maximize the social welfare, which means to maximize the total payment price from all winning SUs. The formulated optimization problem is:
su win the spectrum and 0 i x = , otherwise. The first constraint means that the total amount of channels auctioned to SUs cannot exceed the quantity leased from PU. The second constraint assumes that there are only two states for each SU, i.e, win or lose. When the winner determination problem has been solved, a novel payment function was designed, and we will introduce it later in the payment rule part.
Improved Hybird Genetic Algorithm
The winners determination problem(WDP) can be regarding as 0/1 knapsack problem which is NPcomplete problem and there are no algorithms could guarantee to run out the solution in polynomial time [7] . Genetic Algorithms has been proved to be well the suited for optimal solutions to larger NP-complete problems [8] . The genetic algorithms only generate chromosomes for the solution and check whether the new chromosomes are really solutions. There have been too many introductions to the genetic algorithms, so we will just introduce our improved Hybird Genetic Algorithms.
The proposed algorithm improved the performance of this algorithm in the following several aspects:the first is that as mentioned above, we enable the spectrum spatial reuse among SUs. The second is that if one chromosome is not a real solution, drop the bidder with the minimum if the state is 1, change it to 0. The third is that modified fitness function to make it more suitable for the second-price auction.
After modified all the upper aspects, the principal steps of improved Hybrid Genetic Algorithms are listed: 1) Start:Grouping all the SUs and initialize the first generation into different layers. Stratify all SUs, make each layer of the SUs can share the same channels to achieve the spectrum spatial reuse.
a)
Layered: Divided all the SUs into several subsets, all the SUs in one subset can share the same channels, also they are stored by their demands descending.
b)
Initialize the first generation of the population by Greedy Algorithm and Random Algorithm. 2) Inspection:If the total demand is bigger than the pack size, then drop bidders from the tail of the equation (4).
First, check every chromosome in the current population without any regard of the concepts of spectrum spatial reuse. If the SUs' total demand is bigger than m , then search the states of SU from the tail of the equation (4), if the state is 1, change it to 0 until the total demand does not exceed m . Second, join layered into account to achieve the spectrum spatial reuse among SUs. Crossover: The only difference with the traditional Hybrid Genetic Algorithm is paying attention to the question: doesn't allow the same chromosomes. If there is the same value, then delete it.
c)
Mutation:The mutation operation has no difference with the traditional Hybrid Genetic Algorithm. 5) Replace: Replace the current population with the new population. 6) Judge: Judge whether the end condition is met. If cases, stop the algorithm or return to step 2 on the contrary.
When layered all the bidders, we should initialize the first generation of the population. Get one chromosome by Greedy Algorithm and get others randomly. Ordering bidders with i i b d and put the maximum one into the pack until the pack is full. Then get all the other chromosomes by random algorithm. Now the first generation of the population has been generated.
Payment Rule
In this part, we mainly introduce the payment rule after all the winners are determined. The "Vickrey-Clark-Groves" (VCG) payment rule does not fit this approximation algorithms very well, in a general way. We adopt the idea of Second Price Auction to form a new payment function in order to better adapt to our auction. We can calculate the payment of each winning j su by distinguishing two cases: The first is that if j su loses or it wins but it is the smallest bidder during the auction (i.e., j B − = ∅ ), then its payment is 0. The second is that if j su wins the auction, and its demand is j d and j B − ≠ ∅ , the payment j q can be represented as
After reaching each winner bidders' payment, then it's the spectrum broker's task to calculate how many channels PU should lease in reality, lets m′ denotes. We denotes v to express how much revenue PU can get. The calculation formula of both m′ and v is
W is a gathering of all the winner bidders. V is the collection of winners who have the biggest demands in each subset get by Algorithm Grouping.
Numerical Results
In this section, we do some simulation to evaluate the improved genetic algorithm in the auction framework with one primary user and multiple cognitive users with different spectrum demands. For comparison purpose, the greedy algorithm which enables the spectrum spatial reuse among SUs is also simulated as a benchmark.
The considered cognitive radio network consists of 20 SUs and one PU. For the PU, the number of auctioned channels it offers is randomly selected in [20, 50] Chs, and in order to convenient, we assume that the bandwidth is equal. For each SU , i i N ∀ ∈ , it's spectrum requirement is selected randomly in [5, 50] , while its SNR i γ is random in [50, 100]. All the results are based on average over 1000 runs. Figure 2 shows the social welfare of improved hybrid genetic algorithms with or without spectrum spatial reuse. In the study of the before literature, the spectrum spatial reuse didn't have been considered. Here we design a new way to solve the reuse problem with a time complexity o(n). At the beginning of an auction, all the SUs are layered. Then do the auction without spectrum spatial reuse. After the winners are identified, update the SUs as winners who lost in the auction but there is a SU in the same layer with a bigger demand win. Figure 3 shows the SUs' satisfaction ratio of the improved hybrid genetic algorithm with or without spectrum spatial reuse among SUs. From the figure, we can figure out that a higher SUs' satisfaction ratio. In other words, more SUs' could get the spectrum if the spatial reuse is enabled.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a truthful spectrum auction between one PU and multiple SUs. The auction processes are regarded as a 0/1 knapsack problem, and the hybrid genetic algorithm is marked to solve the 0/1 knapsack problem so the problem can be worked out in polynomial time. In order to improve the efficiency of the hybrid genetic algorithms, we did the improvement in four aspects. According to the inspiration of VCG auction, we designed a payment rule to ensure the authenticity of the auction. Numerical results show that the auction algorithm has a good performance in solving the winner determination problem. In the future study, a more comprehensive consideration should be taken into the auction framework to have a higher practicability.
